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Introduction
Throughout the hidden-information strand of the principal-agent literature either two types or a continuum of types are taken as representative for a world that typically would rather involve a large discrete type-set. While (under certain regularity conditions) both approaches yield qualitatively similar results when types can be ordered in a "proper way", this ceases to be the case as soon as countervailing incentives arise (for example, because of type-dependent reservation utilities).
With countervailing incentives the continuous-type papers, as e.g. Champsaur and Rochet [4] , Feenstra and Lewis [5] , and Lewis and Sappington [10, 11] , get a variety of different results, depending on the technical assumptions in the underlying modeling approaches. So, in [10] the optimal contract is characterized by upward distortion in production for high-cost types, downward distortion for low-cost types, and efficient production at a single interior point and at the two extremes of the type distribution. By contrast, in [4] the classical result of no distortion at the top and downward distortion for all lower types is simply turned upside down. Also, all types but a single one might earn strictly positive rents as in [4] and [10] , or a nondegenerate interval of types might be held to its reservation utility as in [5] and [11] .
Apart from those differences the solutions in most continuous-type papers share a common property: The optimal contract involves a range of pooling even when standard monotonicity conditions are imposed.
In contrast to the continuous-type papers the discrete papers by Caillaud et al. [2] , Laffont and Tirole [7, 8] , Rochet [14] , and Stiglitz [16] -all restricting their attention to a binary type-set -reach quite uniform conclusions. They show that, depending on the strength of countervailing incentives, either classical, reversed classical, or first best results are obtained. Irrespective of which of these cases prevails the second best contract is necessarily fully separating. The first contribution reaching some level of generality in analyzing countervailing incentives is Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [12] . These authors show that the properties of second best contracts in a continuous-type framework crucially depend on whether the agent's reservation utility is concave, linear or convex in his type. If it is strictly concave, or linear respectively, the qualitative results of [10] , or [5] and [11] respectively, obtain and the optimal contract entails pooling. However, if the agent's reservation utility is convex in type, the equilibrium is separating.
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare's paper adds considerably to our understanding of the continuous-type environment. However, since reality is discrete and continuity a mathematical fiction the question remains whether the properties of the continuum case carry over to a discrete framework. If the type-space is restricted to two, as in previous work, the answer is no. 1 We show that, as soon as at least three types are introduced, all the qualita-tive results of the continuous-type papers can be derived in a simple and easy understandable discrete framework without imposing artificial regularity conditions. Thus, the answer to the question stated in the title is, that in order to represent a world with a large discrete type-space, one should rather choose between a three-type discrete and a continuous-type model than restrict oneself to two types. In short, two are not a good representative for many.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 treats the binary setting. Section 4 studies the three-type case and derives the main results. We conclude in Section 5. 
The Model
We focus on a situation where one player, the principal (P ), owns a productive technology and employs a second player, the agent (A), to run it on her behalf. The output of the technology is called gross benefit and is denoted by x ∈ IR + . Producing x causes a cost, or disutility, to the agent which is denoted by g i (x). The index i ∈ I = {1, ..., n} represents all the private information which A has about his environment, his ability and his preferences, and is referred to as A's type. A knows his type before a contract is 2 Before proceeding, we would like to acknowledge an earlier, fairly general analysis of the discrete screening model, presented by Spence [15] . Although Spence doesn't consider type-dependent reservation utilities the present work nevertheless makes considerable use of his insights.
agreed upon, but P does not. P 's beliefs about i are represented by a known probability vector π= (π 1 , . . . , π n ) on I = {1, . . . , n}.
For all i ∈ I, g i (.) is strictly positive, strictly increasing, and strictly convex on IR + . Producing a gross benefit of 0 causes no cost to the agent so that g i (0) = 0 for all i ∈ I. A higher realization of i is assumed to imply lower total and marginal cost for all x > 0, and the difference in costs between two different types is assumed to be increasing at a nondecreasing rate with output. For i < j we define
The above assumptions imply that ∆g ij (·) is a positive, strictly increasing and convex function.
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The principal designs a contract to maximize her expected utility. She is assumed to be riskneutral with a utility function represented by V = x − t, where t is the transfer (compensation) paid from P to A. The agent's utility is his compensation minus the cost of producing output: U i = t − g i (x). The agent's outside opportunities are represented by his reservation utility, R.
3 Caillaud and Hermalin [1] impose a similar set of assumptions and call it the "screening condition". In the present context this (quite strong) version of the screening condition is, for example, satisfied if (i) gross benefit is the sum of some (exogenous) productivity parameter and the agent's (endogenous) effort, (ii) higher types have greater productivity parameters, and (iii) the agent's cost, or disutility, of effort increases at an increasing rate with effort. Weaker versions of the screening condition (without the convexity assumption) have been used in the literature, e.g. in [13] .
Since the realization of this variable might depend on A's type R is indexed by i.
By the revelation principle, we can restrict attention to direct truthful contracts of the form (x, t) = ((x 1 , t 1 ), . . . , (x n , t n )), where x i is the output level designated for type i, and t i is the compensation paid from P to A if A chooses x i . 4 To avoid lots of conditional statements it is useful to assume that the gross benefit generated by any type is sufficiently large so that hiring the agent is always profitable. With this assumption and the definition
we can write P 's problem as:
We denote the solution to the first best problem, where P maximizes her expected benefit subject to (IR i ) only, by (x * , u * ). If we assume that g 1 (0) < 1 the first best solution satisfies g i (x * i ) = 1 and
Turning to the second best some preliminary results are worth mentioning.
First, notice that the incentive compatibility constraints (IC ij ) and (IC ji ) are, for any pair i < j, equivalent to
As ∆g ij (·) is a positive increasing function this relation can be met only if
x i ≤ x j (and thus u i ≤ u j ). An immediate consequence is:
Lemma 2.1 A necessary and sufficient condition for an output vector x = (x 1 , ..., x n ) to be implementable is
Proof: Necessity follows from (2). For sufficiency let R max be the maximal element in {R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R n }. Put u 1 = R max , and for any i > 1, u i =
for j < i − 1 is similar. Hence, all the incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied. 2
Before proceeding, it is necessary to introduce an assumption guaranteeing convexity of P 's second best maximization approach. The problem can best be seen from (2) . With constant reservation utilities only the second inequality in this relation matters, and since ∆g ij is a convex function, P 's problem is well behaved. However, with countervailing incentives either of the two inequalities might be binding, possibly leading to violations of the second order conditions. To guarantee that these conditions are always satisfied we assume in what follows that
With this assumption we get: 5 The claim that this assumption implies that the second order conditions are satisfied is proven in the Appendix. An alternative assumption that does not involve probabilities would be that the differences in productivities between different types are increasing at a Lemma 2.2 All adjacent incentive compatibility constraints cannot be simultaneously binding.
Proof:
The result follows from the first order conditions, (2) and x * 1 < x * n .
Implication Pooling can only be a local, never a global phenomenon. That is, if x i = x j for i = j then there exists some type k such that x k = x j . Figure 1 . Figure 1 shows that as ∆R 21 increases it passes over 4 different threshold levels, defining 5 regions, each characterized by the constraints that are binding. 6 In [2] , [7] and [8] , countervailing incentives arise because the agent's reservation utility is type-dependent. In [14] , a bi-dimensional type-set leads to countervailing incentives.
In [16] , various causes of countervailing incentives are studied in the context of optimal taxation. 7 The notation of Figure 1 is borrowed from Rochet [14] .
? e1 The benchmark levelsx
2 ) are independent of ∆R 21 and as defined in Table I . 8 If ∆R 21 is negative (type decreasing reservation utilitiy), zero (constant reservation utility), or positive but fairly small the higher-type agent has an incentive to pose as the lower-type one in order to signal that his disutility of effort is high so that a high transfer is required to compensate him for production. To counteract this tendency a rent is conceded to type 2. This rent makes it optimal to distort type one's output level downward tox 1 . Down- 8 In the notation of Table I, the head stands for up-, the tilde for downward distorted. The first best is no longer implementable if ∆R 21 passes ∆g 12 (x * 2 ). Then the binding incentive problem becomes to prevent the lower-type agent from exaggerating his productivity in order to signal that his reservation utility is high, i.e. to signal that a high transfer is needed to compensate him for staying with the principal. The optimal contract mitigates this incentive problem by distorting upwards the output level intended for type 2. Doing so relaxes (IC 12 ) because the lower-type agent is less productive. Type 1, on the other hand, is not jeopardized by any other type so that there is no distortion at the bottom. In the first region after ∆g 12 (x * 2 ) both individual rationality constraints are binding and x 2 increases gradually towardsx 2 .
Then x 2 remains constant atx 2 and the transfer to the lower-type agent is increased leaving this type a strictly positive rent.
A Good Representative For Many
In contrast to the binary setting summarized in the previous section most of the continuous-type models with countervailing incentives share the feature that the solution involves ranges of pooling even if standard regularity conditions are imposed. Also, for a given shape of the reservation-utility function the agent may have an incentive to either understate or overstate his private information, depending on its realization. Moreover, the characteristics of the optimal contract strongly depend on specific assumptions on the probability distribution over types and on the derivative of the reservation utility with respect to type (cf., for example, Jullien [6] , and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [12] ). Since the rational for using continuous-type models is that they are a useful idealization of a situation with a large finite number of types, an important question is whether the continuum results carry over to a discrete framework. In this section we show that, by introducing a third type, the most important qualitative results of continuous-type papers can be replicated in our discrete framework without imposing artificial regularity conditions. Thus, the answer to the question stated in the title is that in order to represent a world with a large finite type-space, one should rather choose between a three-type discrete and a continuous-type model than restrict oneself to two types.
We begin our analysis of the three-type case with a distinctive feature of our discrete framework, namely that there exist conditions under which the optimal contract is necessarily fully separating independently of the differences in reservation utilities between adjacent types, that is, independently of ∆R i+1,i ≡ R i+1 − R i . As we will argue later (see Footnote 11 below), finding such conditions becomes increasingly difficult as the number of types increases.
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Proposition 4.1 In the three-type case the second best contract is never pooling (independently of ∆R 21 and ∆R 32 ) iff 
10
The size and location of these areas depend on A's disutility of effort function g(·) and on P 's probability belief π. The dotted line in Figure 2 is given by ∆R 32 = ∆g 23 (∆g
12 (∆R 21 )) and is the only line in the figure that is not necessarily a straight line.
To get some intuition for the forces at work in a separating setup let us start with a familiar environment and then study the adjustments in the optimal contract if we gradually change one of the differences in reservation- )) we are in that subregion of the classical area M 1 where the (conventional) "pure classical case" is implemented. In the pure classical case x 1 =x 1 , x 2 =x 2 and x 3 = x * 3 . The reason for this is straightforward: If the differences in reservation utilities are small, or even negative, then each higher type agent has an incentive to pose as a lower type one in order to signal that a high transfer is required to compensate him for production. To counteract this tendency a rent must be conceded to the higher types. The magnitude of these rents positively depends on the production levels intended for the lower types. she implements the classical case for two types, i.e., x 2 =x 2 and x 3 = x * 3 . This ceases to be optimal if ∆R 21 passes the threshold ∆g 12 (x 2 ). Then we get to an area where only the incentive compatibility constraints pointing to the centre are binding. We refer to this as the centrepetal area. In this area P 's problem is to prevent the lowest type from exaggerating his productivity in order to signal that his reservation utility is high, while the highest-type agent has still an incentive to understate his productivity in order to signal that his disutility of effort is high. To counteract these tendencies rents could be conceded to both, type 1 and type 3. The magnitudes of these rents would depend upon the output level x 2 . The rent of type 1 would decrease in x 2 while that for type 3 would increase in x 2 . If ∆R 21 is high enough rents to both types are indeed paid and a tradeoff between rent extraction for these types and production efficiency for type 2 is made in designing x 2 .
The resulting production levelx 2 lies in the interval (x 2 ,x 2 ) and is smaller, equal or larger than x * 2 depending on the differences in productivities and on the probabilities. If ∆R 21 lies between ∆g 12 (x 2 ) and ∆g 12 (x 2 ) then type 1 is held to his reservation utility and x 2 is gradually adjusted fromx 2 tox 2 .
Next let us hold ∆R 21 fixed at the high level while ∆R 32 is still low. If ∆R 32 increases we get to a threshold (not shown in the figure) where (IR 3 ) becomes binding. In the following region u 3 must increase in R 3 in order to satisfy (IR 3 ). This relaxes (IC 32 ). As (IC 12 ) is still binding x 2 is gradually increased fromx 2 towardsx 2 . If the increase in ∆R 32 continues we get to area M 7 . In this area (IC 32 ) is slack and P implements the first best for type 3. For types 1 and 2, on the other hand, she implements the two-type reversed classical case, i.e., x 1 = x * 1 and x 2 =x 2 . If the increase in ∆R 32 still continues we pass the threshold to the reversed classical area and get (again after an adjustment region where IR 2 is binding) to the "pure reversed classical case" for three types, where the only binding individual rationality constraint is (IR 3 ), and where the binding incentive problem is to prevent the lower types from exaggerating their productivities in order to signal that their reservation utilities are high. Here, x 1 = x * 1 , x 2 =x 2 and x 3 =x 3 for a symmetric reason to that given in the "pure classical case".
If we hold ∆R 32 fixed at the high level and decrease ∆R 21 we get, again after several adjustment regions, to an area where only the incentive compatibility constraints moving away from the centre are binding. We refer to this as the centrifugal area. Here, production is downward distorted for type 1 (x 1 ≤ x 1 < x * 1 ), upward distorted for type 3 (x * 3 < x 3 ≤x 3 ), and efficient for type 2 (x 2 = x * 2 ). The two extreme types are held to their reservation utilities while type 2 might earn strictly positive rents.
A last area worth mentioning is that in the centre of Figure 2 : If the differences in reservation utilities are in an intermediate range, the agent's incentive to overstate his reservation utility (which requires overstating his type) and his incentive to overstate his disutility of effort (which requires understating his type) are in balance and the first best solution is feasible.
We are now in the position to explain the following result: Figure 2 is drawn under the assumption that x * 1 <x 2 andx 2 < x * 3 . It is obvious that, as soon as, say, the first inequality is violated the classical area, M 1 , and the centripetal area, M 3 , intersect, which leads to pooling between type 1 and type 2. Thus, the second best contract is never pooling iff x * 1 <x 2 andx 2 < x * 3 . To show that these conditions are equivalent to (3) and (4) 
Sketch of Proof of Proposition 4.3:
∆g 23 (x). From the second order condition beeing satisfied it follows that f (.) < 0. Furthermore, f (x 2 ) = 0 by the definition ofx 2 . Thus,
3 ) can be shown in a similar way.
11 2
Pooling occurs if carrying out the tradeoffs between rent extraction and production efficiency discussed above would violate the monotonicity constraint x i ≤ x j for i < j. Two basic forces potentially leading to an incompatibil- 11 Notice that to avoid pooling in a setting with arbitrary many types we would have to assure thatx i <x i+1 for all i ∈ I \ {n}. It is obvious that it becomes increasingly difficult to fulfil this requirement as n increases.
ity with monotonicity can be distinguished. First, an incompatibility might arise with more than 2 types even in absence of countervailing incentives because with incentive constraints binding in a single direction only, second best production levels moving in the same direction might try to "overhaul" each other. Suppose, for example, that in our three-type environment π 2 is low relative to π 1 (π 2 is low relative to π 3 ). Then carrying out the tradeoff between rent extraction and production efficiency discussed above might entail
, violating monotonicity. To save monotonicity of the second best output vector for reservation-utility profiles falling in the classical (reversed classical) area, x 1 and x 2 (x 2 and x 3 ) are bunched on an intermediate output level x 12 (x 23 ) satisfyingx 2 < x 12 <x 1 (x 3 < x 23 <x 2 ). We refer to this kind of pooling as classical-or overtake-pooling. In continuous-type models the occurrence of overtake-pooling is typically prevented by imposing up-and downward hazard-rate conditions. In a discrete framework these conditions are only sufficient to avoid overtake-pooling if the ∆g h,h+1 s are independent of h.
(Insert Figure 3) More interesting and specific to settings with countervailing incentives is a second kind of pooling which we refer to as centripetal-or crash-pooling.
Crash-pooling arises if incentive constraints binding towards the centre cause potential violations of the monotonicity constraint. For example, if π 3 is large relative to π 2 (π 1 is large relative to π 2 ) the basic tradeoffs might entail 12 (∆R 21 )). So, if the occurrence of overtake-pooling is prevented by imposing adequate regularity conditions (as it is typically done in continuous-type papers) the optimal contract is fully separating if the profile of differences in reservation utilities under consideration lies above the dotted line. This corresponds exactly to the continuous-type results of Jullien [6] , and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [12] .
12 By contrast, if the agent's outside opportunities are such that the centripetal case applies, imposing these regularity conditions does not prevent pooling, a finding consistent with the results of Feenstra and Lewis [5] , and Lewis and Sappington [10, 11] . 12 Notice, that imposing "homogeneity" -a condition first introduced by Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [12] and so named by Jullien [6] 
Conclusion
We have shown that the most important qualitative results derived in continuous-type models with countervailing incentives can be replicated in a discrete framework with at least three types. In a three-type model the properties of second best contracts strongly depend on the differences in reservationutilities between adjacent types. If these differences are small (classical area) the second best contract exhibits the conventional features of "no distortion at the top" and downward distortion for lower types. The lowest type gets his reservation utility while higher types might earn rents. If the differences in reservation-utility are large (reversed classical area) the conventional results are turned upside down, i.e., the optimal contract is characterized by "no distortion at the bottom" and upward distortion for higher types as well as by positive rents for lower types and no rents for the highest type.
More interesting phenomena arise if the differences in reservation utilities are strongly de-or increasing. In the first (the centripetal) case the second best contract typically has "no distortion at the extremes", upward distortion for lower and downward distortion for higher types. The type in the centre gets his reservation utility while types in the peripheries might earn rents. Exactly the opposite is true in the second (the centrifugal) case. Here the second best contract exhibits "no distortion in the centre", upward distortion for higher and downward distortion for lower types. The types at the extremes get their reservation utilities while the moderate type might earn rents.
We have identified two kinds of pooling. Overtake-pooling might arise even in absence of countervailing incentives and its occurrence is prevented by imposing standard regularity conditions. Crash-pooling is peculiar to models with countervailing incentives and infects only the centripetal area.
Since continuous-type papers typically impose regularity conditions excluding overtake-pooling, their result that the optimal contract is fully separating when the agent's reservation-utility is convex in type (corresponding to reservation-utility profiles in the centrifugal area) while it might entail pooling in the concave (centripetal) case is perfectly in line with our analysis, as are the other characteristics of second best contracts derived in the continuum literature.
Appendix
In Section 4 of the paper we present conditions that exclude pooling (Propo- 
A1 Some General Results
We start by writing down the first and second order conditions of P 's maximization problem. Letting λ ij and µ i be the Lagrange multipliers associated with (IC ij ) and (IR i ) the first order conditions (FOCs) for this program are:
The second order conditions (SOCs) are :
We varify later that the assumption introduced in Section 2 of the paper guarantees that the SOCs are always satisfied.
The following Lemmas are useful in proving Propositions 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3:
Lemma S 1 Suppose that x 1 ≤ x 2 ≤ . . . ≤ x n . Further suppose that for any i ∈ I the adjacent incentive compatibility constraints (IC i,i+1 ) and (IC i,i−1 )
hold. Then all the incentive compatibility constraints hold.
Proof: Take any j > i + 1. Adding constraints (IC i,i+1 ), (IC i+1,i+2 ) , . . . , (IC j−1,j ) and using x i+1 ≤ x i+2 ≤ . . . ≤ x j shows that (IC ij ) is satisfied.
The argument for j < i − 1 is similar. is binding.
Proof: This follows immediately from (1b) for type i and from the fact that (1b) for types 1 to n implies n j=1 µ j = 1.
Lemma S 4
There is never downward distortion in production at the top and never upward distortion at the bottom. That is: x n ≥ x * n and x 1 ≤ x *
.
Proof: Since g n (x n ) − g j (x n ) < 0 and g 1 (x 1 ) − g j (x 1 ) > 0 for all j, this follows from (1a). Proof: In the first claim λ i+1,i > 0 while all other λ's are zero. Thus, (1a)
and hence x i < x * i . The other claims follow from similar arguments. 2 Lemma S 6 Assume that Π i g i (x) > Π i−1 g i−1 (x) holds for any i ∈ I. Then for any separating solution satisfying the FOCs, the SOCs are satisfied as well.
Proof: By Lemma S 1 only adjacent incentive compatibility constraints matter. Thus, the FOC (1b) for i ∈ I simplifies to: 
where the last term is strictly positive by assumption. 2
A2 Proof of Propositions 4.1. and 4.2
Propositions S 1 to S 6 characterize optimal separating contracts for the three-type case. In these propositions reference is made to 9 different areas in the IR 2 stretched by the possible differences in reservation utilities (∆R 21 , ∆R 32 ). follows fromx 1 < x * 1 < x * 2 ). These conditions are met iff:
Ad 5.2: From the FOCs:
. From the binding constraints: u i = R i for i = 1, 2, 3 and ∆R 21 = ∆g 12 (x 1 ). It is left to check:
(IC 23 ) and (IC 32 ). These conditions are met iff:
Ad 6.1: From the FOCs:
. From the binding constraints: u i = R i for i = 1, 2 and u 3 = R 2 + ∆g 12 (x 2 ). It remains to be checked: (IR 3 ), (IC 12 ) and (IC 21 ) ((IC 23 ) follows fromx 2 < x * 2 < x * 3 ). These conditions are met iff:
Ad 6.2: From the FOCs:
. From the binding constraints: u i = R i for i = 1, 2, 3 and ∆R 32 = ∆g 23 (x 2 ). It remains to be checked: (IC 12 ) and (IC 21 ) ((IC 23 ) follows from x 2 < x * 2 < x * 3 ). These conditions are met iff:
The other 4 cases can be shown in similar ways. 
. Furthermore, from the binding constraints:
. The following conditions remain to be checked: (IR 2 ), (IR 3 ) and (IC 12 ) ((IC 23 ) follows fromx 2 < x * 2 < x * 3 ). This leads to the empty set wheneverx 2 <x 1 since then (IC 12 ) is violated. Forx 1 <x 2 we get:
. From the binding constraints: u i = R i for i = 1, 2, u 3 = R 2 + ∆g 23 (x 2 ) and ∆R 21 = ∆g 12 (x 1 ).
It remains to be checked: (IR 3 ) and (IC 12 ) ((IC 23 ) follows fromx 2 < x * 3 ). As before the resulting set is empty wheneverx 2 <x 1 since then (IC 12 ) is violated. Forx 1 <x 2 :
Ad 1.3: From the FOCs:x 1 < x 1 ≤x 1 ,x 2 < x 2 < x * 2 , x 3 = x * 3 . From the binding constraints: u i = R i for i = 1, 3 and u 2 = R 1 + ∆g 12 (x 1 ) = R 3 − ∆g 23 (x 2 ). It remains to be checked: (IR 2 ) and (IC 12 ) ((IC 23 ) follows from x * 2 < x * 3 ). By the FOCs x 1 and x 2 are given bỹ
x 2 (µ) :
and (x 1 (π 3 ),x 2 (π 3 )) = (x 1 , x * 2 ) this condition is trivially satisfied ifx 1 ≤x 2 . Violations of the monotonicity constraint may, however, occure ifx 2 <x 1 .
In this case the interval (0, π 3 ) may fall into several subintervals such that x 1 (µ) >x 2 (µ) for realizations of µ in every second subinterval and the reverse in the rest. In what follows we simply assume that ifx 1 (µ ) ≤x 2 (µ ) for
13 . With this assumption we get: (3) and (4), and
. From the binding constraints: u i = R i for all i, ∆R 21 = ∆g 12 (x 1 ) and ∆R 32 = ∆g 23 (x 2 ). It remains to be checked: (IC 12 ) ((IC 23 ) follows from
). This leads to: Ad 2.1: From the FOCs:
From the binding constraints:
It remains to be checked: (IR 1 ), (IR 2 ) and (IC 32 ) ((IC 21 ) follows from x * 1 < x * 2 <x 2 ). Forx 3 <x 2 we get the empty set since then (IC 32 ) is violated. Ifx 2 <x 3 :
Ad 2.2: From the FOCs:
From the binding constraints: 
It remains to be checked: (IR 2 ) and (IC 21 ). By the FOCs x 2 and x 3 are determined by:
x 3 (µ) :
for µ ∈ (π 2 + π 3 , 1). Thus, (IC 21 ) is satisfied iffx 2 (µ) ≤x 3 (µ). As in the classical case we make the simplifying assumption that ifx 2 (µ ) ≤x 3 (µ ) for
With this assumption we get: 
. From the binding constraints: follows that f (.) < 0. Furthermore, f (x 2 ) = 0 by the definition ofx 2 . Thus,
3 ) can be shown in a similar way. 2
A3 Proof of Proposition 4.3 (Pooling between Types 1 and 2)
Pooling between types 1 and 2 means that both, (IC 12 ) and (IC 21 ) are binding so that x 1 = x 2 (=: x 12 ). By Lemma S 4, x 1 ≤ x * 1 < x * 2 . If IC 32 is slack then, by Lemma S 5, x * 2 ≤ x 2 , contradicting x 1 = x 2 . Hence, (IC 32 ) is binding and thus, by Lemma 2.2 in the paper, (IC 23 ) is slack, so that λ 21 , λ 12 , λ 32 > 0 and λ 23 = 0. Hence,x 2 < x 12 < x * 1 , which is only possible if x 2 < x * 1 . Using the FOCs for the u i and adding the equations for x 1 and x 2 yields:
The SOC for x 12 becomes: 
